This paper presents a broad overview of fiscal issues confronting developing countries. Three of these are (i) developing countries have low tax/GDP and expenditure/GDP ratios compared to developed countries, even though developing countries need more public expenditure; (ii) developing country fiscal stance is often pro-cyclical; (iii) developing country tax resources are more volatile than those of developed countries. I also consider the issue of budgetary deficits and problems arising therefrom in developing countries. I then discuss some widely accepted norms for tax and expenditure reforms as also some issues of intergovernmental transfers in federal developing countries.
I. Introduction
Fiscal policy plays an increasingly important role in many developing countries.
Decisions on fiscal policy, especially if properly synchronised with monetary policy, can help smoothen business cycles, ensure adequate public investment and redistribute incomes.
The four main components of fiscal policy are (i) expenditure, budget reform (ii) revenue (particularly tax revenue) mobilization, (iii) deficit containment/ financing and (iv) determining fiscal transfers from higher to lower levels of government.
Fiscal policy works through both aggregate demand and aggregate supply channels.
Changes in total taxes and public expenditure affect the level of aggregate demand in the economy, whereas, the structure of taxation and public expenditure affect, among others, the incentives to save and invest (at home and abroad), take risks, and export and import goods and services. This paper presents a broad overview of fiscal issues confronting developing countries. Three of these are (i) developing countries have low tax/GDP and expenditure/GDP ratios compared to developed countries, even though developing countries need more public expenditure; (ii) developing country fiscal stance is often pro-cyclical; (iii) developing country tax resources are more volatile than those of developed countries. These issues are considered in section II of this paper. Section III considers the issue of budgetary deficits and problems arising therefrom in developing countries. Section IV considers some widely accepted norms for tax and expenditure ASARC Working Paper 2007/01 Table 1 shows tax revenues in different categories of countries: developed, transition and developing for two time periods 1990 to 1995 and 1996 to 2002 . In the median developing country the tax/GDP ratio is only 15.7 per cent whereas in the median transition economy it is 25.4 per cent. Developed countries collect almost twice as much as developing countries in tax revenue. What is also remarkable about Table 1 is that developing country collections of tax revenues (as percentages of their GDPs) have come down over time whereas the opposite has happened in the case of developed countries. Hence, on average, governments in many developing countries face a severe resource crunch.
A complication in interpreting Table 1 is that some countries -developed, transition and developing -are federal in nature so that total government revenues outpace central government revenues. Table 2 compares total government tax revenues across these categories of countries. Only 3 of 21 developed countries and 2 of 14 transition countries had revenues coming down over the two time periods whereas the corresponding magnitude for developing countries was 5 of 13. Furthermore, not only are developing country revenues lower than those for developed countries but also the share of distortionary commodity and trade taxes in total central government revenue is higher for developing as opposed to developed countries (Table 3) . Finland  21  21  34  35  0  0  2  2  32  30  12  11   Guatemala  19  25  46  58  23  10  3  1  2  2  6  4   Hungary  19  36  2  2  33  8   India  23  35  28  31  24  14  0  0  0  0  25  19   Jamaica  30  34  9  7  7  0   Malaysia  37  47  26  21  12  6  5  0  1  19  26   South Africa  51  35  3  4  2  5   Sri Lanka  12  14  49  56  17  12  4  1  1  1  18  16   Tajikistan  6  3  63  54  12  11  0  1  13  12  5 Similar results obtain for broad aggregates of these categories of countries as Tables 4 and 5 reveal. The fact that informal sectors are larger in developing as opposed to developed countries has important implications for tax design and effectiveness. Auriol and Warlters (2005) argue that the larger size of the informal sector in developing countries arises from the higher costs of entry into the formal economy in developing countries.
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The reason for this is that by keeping barriers to entry into the formal economy at high levels those firms and individuals who make it into the formal economy acquire large rents and hence may be easier to tax than a diffused set of small taxpayers. In the face of globalization firms and individuals are freer to adopt global strategies. However, national governments must, perforce, think in terms of domestic allocation of resources, the national account books, increasing the domestic rate of growth, protecting the domestic poor and so on. In this sense, the scope of activities of governments and those of the best and most dynamic firms and individuals are tending to divert from each other more than at any other time in the past. The future has much more of this in store. Thus increased liberalization of financial markets has improved the international allocation of savings and reduced the cost of capital. But it has also widened the opportunities for tax evasion and avoidance. Taxpayers can now raise income outside of conventional channels without the knowledge of the tax authorities.
There does not seem to be an easy antidote for this except to encourage rules-based tax laws, good governance and greater cooperation with international taxation bodies.
With inflexible public expenditures and low tax revenues government finances in many developing countries are weak, with high deficits, debts and debt-servicing obligations. Consolidated figures for the finances of central and local governments together are not readily available for many countries but Table 7 presents these for the central governments of select developed, transition and developing countries.
In general for developing countries revenues and expenses are lower and interest payments higher than in developed countries. 1995 2004 1995 2004 1995 2004 1995 2004 1995 2004 As percentages of GDP, however, governments of developing countries consume less than their developed country counterparts, as Table 9 indicates. Further, if African countries are excluded from the sample, government consumption in developing countries turns out to be even lower. The analysis above has shown that even as developing countries need more public revenue their ability to raise tax revenues is limited. The most immediate explanation for this is the fact that tax collections are endogenous to the GDP.
Indeed as reported in Jha (2006) ) for several developing countries is larger than one, indicating that an expansion of income would lead to an increase in the tax/GDP ratio. Conversely a country with a lower per capita income than another would have a disproportionately lower tax/GDP ratio. However, in addition to the impact of GDP, there exist political economy explanations for the observed low tax/GDP ratios.
Thus Gordon and Li (2005) argue that taxation, by its very nature, has to depend on the formal economy, i.e., on the information available from bank records in order to identify ASARC Working Paper 2007/01 taxable entities and to measure the amount of their taxable activity. Firms face taxes only to the extent that they conduct transactions through the financial sector. If taxes are too high then it may become profitable for firms to conduct some or all of their activities outside the formal sector, in order to avoid these taxes. In rich countries the intermediary services provided by the financial sector are considerable so there is a high cost of abandoning it and conducting business in the informal sector. However, this is not the case in developing countries. Gordon and Li show that, as a consequence of this, tax revenue as a proportion of GDP is likely to be lower in developing countries than in developed countries. Further, the tax base is likely to be narrow and cover mostly capital-intensive firms that need the financial sector the most. As a consequence the tax structure is likely to be biased towards capital income. Further, tariffs would be used to protect the capital intensive sectors and shortfalls in revenue (from public expenditures)
would often be met through seigniorage, hence inflation would be high.
Apart from the characteristics of tax and expenditure in terms of levels discussed above, another important characteristic of fiscal variables in developing countries is their relative instability. Table 10 reports on the coefficient of variation of key fiscal variables in 13 Latin American developing countries as compared to 14 industrialised countries.
In terms of all the categories discussed and in both nominal and real terms computed coefficients of variation are much higher (sometimes by multiples) for Latin American developing countries than for industrialised countries. Source: Bertin-Levecq, S. (2000) N.B.:
1. There are 13 Latin American and 14 industrialised countries. In the sample 2. The Gavin and Perotti (1997) database is used for the analysis.
Not only are fiscal variables more volatile for many developing countries, it is also the case that the movement of fiscal variables is pro-cyclical. Standard Keynesian models imply that fiscal policy should be countercyclical. During recessions the government should be able to lower taxes and raise public expenditures to 'spend' its way out of the recession whereas during good times, taxes can be raised and public expenditures reduced to reduce chances of overheating of the economy. In contrast to this Keynesian view the 'Ricardian Equivalence' Hypothesis suggested by Barro (1979) suggests that since rational economic agents make decisions based on perfectly anticipated tax and expenditure policies of the government fiscal policy should essentially remain neutral over the business cycle and respond only to unanticipated changes that affect the government's budget constraint. Thus if Keynesian prescriptions are to be followed then fiscal policy should be counter-cyclical, whereas if Barro type prescriptions were being followed there should essentially be no correlation between the phases of the business cycle and fiscal policy.
The empirical evidence seems to suggest that for the G-7 countries the correlation between government consumption and outputs is indeed clustered around zero, substantiating the Barro principle. However, for many developing countries fiscal policy is actually procyclical which is neither Keynesian nor of the Barro type. Two plausible explanations for this phenomenon have been mentioned in the literature. The first is that tax bases are so narrow and public expenditure so inelastic in developing countries that tax revenues and expenditures rise during expansionary phases of the business cycle whereas during recessions revenues and expenditures both decline for similar reasons. In addition, Talvi and Vegh (2005) provide an interesting political economy argument, within the Barro tradition, for the procyclical behaviour of fiscal policy in developing countries. They argue that fluctuations in the tax base are much larger in developing countries than in developed countries (see the evidence in Table 9 ).
Under these circumstances full tax smoothing of the Barro-type would require that there be large surpluses during good times. However, the ability to run such surpluses during good times is limited by the fact that public expenditures are inelastic and, when the budgetary position is favourable, there are likely to be considerable pressures for expanding public expenditures which means that fiscal resources may be wasted in enhanced public expenditures on public sector undertakings, subsidies and the like rather than on the retiring of debt as full tax smoothing would require. This potential for misusing resources can be so large that finance ministers in developing countries try to avoid raising large surpluses which they accomplish by lowering taxes or rasing expenditures, or both, thus making fiscal policy procyclical. Deviations from full tax smoothing may thus be an indirect way of resisting pressures for increasing public expenditure. Using a sample of 56 countries (20 developed and 36 developing countries) the authors show that for the G-7 countries fiscal policy follows the Barro tax smoothing model whereas for the developing countries such policy has been procyclical.
III. Fiscal Deficit Issues in Developing Countries
The exercise of fiscal policy in developing countries has its limits. The combination of low revenues and inelastic expenditures means that expenditures routinely, and even increasingly, outpace revenues. With poor credit and bond markets and downwardly inflexible fiscal expenditures, some of the financing of the resultant deficit spills over onto the external sector and the central bank.
Jha (2004) This, in turn, yields further benefits in terms of higher rates of investment, growth, educational attainment, increased distributional equity and reduced poverty.
If the link between fiscal deficits and monetary expansion were quantitatively strong, there would be a link between the fiscal deficit and inflation -particularly if seignorage revenues were used to close the budgetary gap. However, in developing countries this association is weak. de Haan and Zelhorst (1990) and Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel (1993) find a positive correlation between inflation and the fiscal deficit only when the inflation rate is high and there is a clear seignorage motive to get additional revenue from money creation. However, Buffie (1999) argues that this result can be ascribed to the behaviour of the public sector wage cycle and that the relation between the fiscal deficit and inflation remains intact once this is factored out. Once public expenditure is restrained, perhaps as part of an IMF stabilization programme, there is an expectation that any cut in the real wage in the public sector would be reversed once the strictures of the programare lifted. The disinflationary programme, therefore, lacks credibility. Buffie considers two possible cases: (i) The low wage phase is followed by a high wage phase of equal length so that average wage is unchanged over the wage cycle.
(ii) The low real wage phase is followed by a return of the real wage to its pre-stabilization level. In the first case, since the market expects the real wage rate to rise, inflation picks up even as the deficit falls. Indeed deficit and inflation could be inversely correlated with high inflation prevailing through the low deficit phase. In the second case this result is weaker and depends upon money and consumption being Edgeworth substitutes. Thus the links between fiscal deficit and inflation remain intact even when there is little observed correlation between the two.
Jha (2004) 
IV. Norms for Tax and Expenditure Reforms in Developing Countries
One of the principal aims of a meaningful tax/expenditure reforms policy would be to bolster the savings and investment rates in the economy in order to raise growth rates. A higher growth rate, it is widely accepted, is the best way to lower poverty over the the rate of growth of the economy becomes a circular issue -the higher the rate of savings the higher the rate of growth of the economy and the higher the rate of growth the higher the rate of savings at least at low absolute levels of per capita income. Their results also point to the possibility of incomplete Ricardian Equivalence. In other words, a given rise in public savings is accompanied by a less than commensurate drop in private savings. Had Ricardian equivalence obtained, consumers would realize that any increase in public expenditure would be paid for by taxes and adjust private saving commensurately.
Such empirical studies also point to the relevance of the gap between the real rate of return on savings and the discount rate. The role played by the characteristics of the credit market is crucial here. For instance, it has been discovered that savers who are liquidity constrained may be more sensitive to such differentials as opposed to those who do not face such constraints. As financial deepening takes place and fewer consumers remain liquidity constrained, this responsiveness may drop. However, it might also be the case that as consumers become less liquidity constrained they might become less risk averse and opt for investments with higher returns. This might help boost the rate of savings. Thus the impact of the tax structure on savings is of critical importance. A meaningful research agenda on stimulating saving must, therefore, concentrate on estimating effective tax rates (and implied net rates of return) for various sources of income as well as for different sectors. It would then be necessary to ensure the elimination of distorting differences in effective tax rates across sectors as well as assets.
Since the prime determinant of the saving rate appears to be the level and rate of growth of per capita income, all tax-induced distortions that create inefficiencies and ASARC Working Paper 2007/01 lower the potential rate of economic growth should be eliminated. Thus there is urgent need for tax reforms. The basic tenets of tax reform are well known and far too elaborate for a complete analysis to be attempted here. These are only briefly stated here.
An important canon of tax reform is that as an economy develops reliance on indirect taxation, as a source of revenue should decline. This is because indirect taxes typically have an excess burden (or deadweight losses) associated with them (Jha 1998, chapter 13) . Furthermore efficient indirect taxation (one that minimizes excess burden to the representative consumer, for example) can be quite regressive.1 One can make indirect taxes more progressive by sacrificing some amount of efficiency but the extent of the redistribution possible through such means is quite limited (Sah 1983 ).
This principle applies to indirect taxes that are differentiated and distortionary.
If, however, indirect taxes can be levied on final consumption alone it would be possible to avoid the tax-induced changes in relative prices that characterize production taxes such as excise duties. Then, if consumer utility functions are weakly separable between consumption and leisure, a uniform tax on final consumption goods (say a VAT or, in the case of India, a properly harmonized state and central VAT) would approximate a lump-sum tax. 2 This would be a superior solution to distortionary commodity taxation.
It is implicitly understood that a proper VAT would replace the existing indirect tax structure.
A uniform broad-based consumption tax (such as a VAT) with few exemptions (for goods and services consumed in disproportionately large amounts by the poor), harmonized across levels of government in federal countries and few rates is advocated.
1 Efficient indirect taxation often calls for tax rates to very inversely with the compensated elasticity of demand. This would make them 'regressive'. 2 Separability of the utility function between goods and leisure would indicate that taxation of goods would have no implications for the labor-leisure choice.
These could be supplemented with excise duties on environmental bads or 'luxuries'.
Peak tariff duties and effective rates of protection should be reduced gradually. Such tax reforms could improve the allocation of resources and be administratively simpler. If the tax base admits few exemptions and there are fewer rates, costs of compliance and monitoring will fall. A significant exception to this is the VAT, which requires sophisticated account keeping to net out input costs and exempt exports. Such expertise may be lacking in many developing countries. The credibility of the tax regime is also important and tax reforms should aim for a stable tax environment. Tax reform should be well coordinated and, at all times, be simple. Tariff cuts should be accompanied by an upward revision of VAT rates to compensate for tax revenue.
However, in the particular context of developing countries the implementation of the VAT has to be nuanced. Emran and Stiglitz (2005) show that the standard prescription of reducing trade taxes with a revenue compensating upward revision of the rate of a broad-based VAT is welfare improving only in an economy with no informal sector with all production and exchange activity in the tax net -conditions typically not satisfied in developing countries. CSO (2000) of the 14 cases studied whereas indirect taxes were broadly regressive. The progressivity of direct taxes declined over time in eight cases. This needs attention.
A related principle of tax reform is that the share of direct taxation in overall tax revenue should rise. Within direct taxation, reliance has to be shifted from corporate to income taxes. Since corporate profits are taxed at the level of personal income anyway, the rationale for separate corporate taxes is rather weak. There are only two arguments in favor of corporate taxes: i) as a tax on foreigners' incomes and ii) as a tax on noncompetitive profits. 3 Within the sphere of income taxation, the rate and exemptions structures need to be rationalized. Tax reform theory advocates taxation of 'full income' the Haig-Simons definition of which is 'all increases in human and physical capital during a period of time'. One cannot pick and choose the types of income one would like to tax. This canon has, of course, been grossly violated in many developing countries with several categories of income exempt from income taxation, e.g., agricultural income from income taxation in India.
In line with the 'new' public economics of the Nobel laureates William Vickrey and James Mirrlees, the number of income tax brackets should be small, the degree of progression mild and the top marginal tax rate low. These have been adhered to in the some tax reforms program. However, an important canon of optimal direct taxation is also that there be few, if any income sources that are exempt from taxation. In several cases this has not been adhered to. In addition, the ongoing process of globalization, which developing country economies are going through, creates its own avenues for tax exemptions.
Another area of importance for taxation for many developed countries is the conduct of commerce over the internet (e-commerce). Some have argued that it is best to leave out e-commerce from the tax net. It is a nascent industry, they argue, and taxing it would thwart its growth. However, this argument is flawed. There is a rationale for zero customs duties on e-commerce in line with arguments for free trade, but not for zero taxes. If goods traded through e-commerce were not taxed whereas goods traded through ordinary channels are this would be inefficient as well as inequitable. A commodity that is sold in a bricks and mortar store and, therefore, subject to taxation would be deemed to be different if sold through e-commerce and escape taxation. another avenue for tax evasion. There is U.S. evidence to suggest that sales over the Internet are quite responsive to the failure to collect taxes. Furthermore, given its projected phenomenal rate of growth, if e-commerce is not taxed there will be sharp erosion of the tax bases of governments that primarily levy sales taxes.
It is well recognized that e-commerce presents some formidable challenges for tax administration. Both the origin as well as the destination principles of commodity taxation applied at the subnational level in a country such as India would find it hard to deal with e-commerce. With the physical location of both the buyer and the seller of the commodity in question irrelevant for the transaction, assigning tax liability would be hard. In addition, many goods (such as software) sold through e-commerce are directly downloaded and do not necessarily have a physical presence.
Given the vast scale of anticipated e-commerce transactions, it can safely be said that the smaller the scale of government, the greater would be the difficulty of taxing ecommerce. The central government with its reach throughout the country may find it easier to tax e-commerce than individual state governments, certainly local governments. This further centralization of tax authority and the continued need to further decentralize public expenditures would require the devolution of larger and larger funds to state governments. This would put greater stress on the structure of fiscal transfers necessitating a devolution plan that is transparent, fair and acceptable to all levels of government. This development is a further challenge to federal countries and requires urgent research attention from academics and policy makers. A problem with this methodology is that only existing taxes or public programs may be analyzed. We must evaluate not what does exist but what might exist. This is the theme of benefit incidence analysis. Such analysis is marginal (because it should capture differences from the status quo) and behavioral (because of the need to generate counterfactuals). Such analyses are difficult to carry out in many developing countries.
Addressing behavioral issues -especially labor supply and income generation -is important. But such modeling is difficult in the case of developing countries because direct transfers to households, whether positive or negative, are limited. Further, the distinction between formal and informal labor markets is critical with jobs in the former being subject to some form of rationing.
Delineating expenditure adjustments according to their effects on the poor in and Chile adopted the neo-liberal doctrine of development in a rather pure form and cut many social programs. However social programs, to the extent they were retained, focused exclusively on the services of the poor.
Even within the broad category of basic services, however, the selection of programs needs to be sensitive to the type and severity of deprivation. If malnutrition is widespread a program of subsidized nutritional supplements would be more effective than an elementary education scheme. Rudra (2004) establishes that only the education component of public expenditure encourages a more favorable distribution of income in the face of globalization. Thus, when high inequality is a concern expenditure on education should not be cut; but the decision on what expenditure items are pro-poor is country specific (Van de Walle and Nead 1995).
V. Intergovernmental transfer formula reform in Developing Countries
Most countries including many developing countries have multi-tiered governments.
Many are federal while others have a number of local governments in addition to the central government. The rationale for the existence of multi-tiered governments owes much to the classic statement by Oates (1972) , and has been extensively reviewed (e.g., Jha 1998). The special conditions relating to intergovernmental fiscal relations are surveyed, among others, by Fjeldstad (2001) and Bird and Smart (2002) .
Typically the central government in most countries collects far more tax and non-tax revenues than local levels of governments. There are several reasons for this.
Two of the most well-known reasons for this are that (i) most taxes with high elasticities of revenue (e.g. income taxes and corporate income taxes) can only be levied meaningfully at the central level and (ii) taxation is often used to address concerns of equity. This can often be defined meaningfully only at the national level. State governments typically tax goods and services (increasingly at rates harmonised with those of the central government) and relatively immobile assets, such as landed property.
However, a substantial portion of public expenditure is best carried out by local governments since these are likely to be better aware of peoples' preferences over public expenditure. Hence, there is a structural reason for the existence of a mismatch between revenue and expenditure at both the central and sub-national levels. This is typically bridged through fiscal transfers that the central government makes to lower levels of government.
This transfer formula in developing countries typically involves the following characteristics of the sub-national government to which the transfer is made: (i) population, (ii) departure of average income from national average; (iii) area; (iv) index of infrastructure; (v) tax effort and (vi) fiscal discipline. A review of such formulae is available in Bird and Vaillancourt (1998) and Boadway et al. (2000) . In this section I briefly comment on the principal constituents of this formula, assuming that the relative weights on these constituents will often be determined by country-specific circumstances.
It is important to ensure that the determinants of the transfer are not affected by the transfer amount itself. (Jha et al. 1999) . It is important to measure poverty by the conventional head count ratio, as opposed to per capita income. If data on tax effort are available over a time period then it is useful to examine whether states' tax efforts are converging over time. If this is not the case, special efforts may need to be taken to identify the laggard states.
The variable 'fiscal discipline' as used in many tax devolution formulae can also be improved upon. Typically fiscal discipline is defined as the improvement in the ratio of a state's own revenue receipts to its total revenue expenditure related to a similar ratio for all states. This ratio is used to measure an index of fiscal discipline in a reference period as compared to a base period. However, in so doing the choice of the base year is critical. Further, the measure used does not correct for differential public debt burdens across states. States with high public debts would, ceteris paribus, have higher current expenditures because of the debt servicing obligations and, therefore, some correction for this should be made. Also the measure does not correct for variations in the activity variable across states. Some form of netting out of debt servicing from current expenditure may be tried and also there should be some form of correction for asymmetric incidence of the business cycle across the country.
This last point underscores the importance of developing indirect measures of fiscal discipline. Recently the literature has emphasized the need to develop such measures (Alesina et al. 1999 and Jones et al. 2000) . This literature emphasizes that (i)
Ex-ante constraints on deficits at the sub-national levels are conducive to fiscal discipline. Examples include balanced budgets or ceilings on fiscal deficits type Alesina et al. (1999) show that in an appropriately specified model, this index is a significant determinant of the fiscal deficit. An index similar to that used by Alesina et al. but probably expanded to include state level contingent liabilities, losses of state level public enterprises and the losses of state electricity boards could be used to replace the fiscal discipline index typically used to determine intergovernmental transfers in federal developing countries.
VI. Conclusions
The role of fiscal policy in developing countries is as important as it is complex.
Developing countries face the unenviable task of accelerating their rates of economic growth to reduce poverty is a short span of time even as they face greater uncertainty, in the face of globalization, about key elements of their fiscal policy such as the tax base.
Furthermore, the exercise of fiscal policy is often circumscribed by increasing pressures from the regulatory and exchange rate regimes in place and subject to considerable pressure from external parameters such as competing countries' tax rates. It would be difficult, for example, for a given developing country to have corporate tax rates very different from its competitors or burden monetary policy with high fiscal deficits which could lead to sharp depreciation of the exchange rate.
Nevertheless, the onus on fiscal policy remains substantial. This paper has outlined some of the major challenges that developing countries face in some key areas of fiscal policy: their tax, expenditure and intergovernmental transfer policies. Even here the treatment has been selective, (e.g., there has been little discussion of corporate taxation and indirect tax harmonisation) in order to provide an overview of the issues involved and an introduction to the literature on these topics.
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